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INTRODUCTION
As recent events in Iraq have demonstrated, it is critically important to establish stability and security rapidly in a post-conflict environment to allow the nation-building activities to commence, including reconstruction, elections, winning the hearts and minds of the locals, etc. Postconflict threats and challenges can include looting, day-today uncertainty for the locals, corruption, thuggery, black marketeering, etc., all of which present a significant obstacle to our forces who are responsible for Stability and Support Operations (SASO). Moreover, many physical and social aspects of the post-conflict environment increase the complexity of the planning and execution of SASO missions. These issues include the need to locate and secure weapons caches or wanted individuals, conducting negotiations with local tribal and religious leaders, responding to grievances from the locals, and dealing appropriately with insurgents.
The scope and complexity of military SASO missions can be seen from the current operations conducted by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. SASO missions can cover a wide range of operations for coalition forces, from large-scale openly hostile environments such as those currently found in Baghdad and Fallujah, to smaller scale more discrete operations exemplified by protection of key infrastructure and leadership facilities in and around Kabul, Afghanistan and the "Green Zone" in Baghdad, Iraq. Three SASO missions are of particular interest, namely: (i) fixed site security (check points, guard towers), (ii) mounted and dismounted patrols, and (iii) cordon and search. These are of interest -and they are the focus of the SPEYES seedling initiative -because they are daily-occurring, manpowerintensive, and they offer an opportunity for realizing force multiplier payoffs.
SASO missions also require diverse military skill sets and roles, including peacekeeping and peace enforcing, both small and heavy arms combat, and civil affairs. There are numerous technical challenges to overcome as well. These include an enemy that is more familiar with the physical and social urban terrain than the US forces, resulting in poor situational awareness for US forces. Furthermore, tactical actions can have strategic implications where bad responses can quickly turn neutrals into enemies. US forces may experience difficulties identifying the enemy, since combatants very often intermingle with the non-combatant population. The lethality of asymmetric threats including IEDs, RPGs, VBIEDs, snipers, and suicide bombers is significantly increased. Finally, SASO missions often require highly decentralized small unit operations at the Battalion-Squad level, which poses numerous challenges to ground forces. Historically, rapid post-conflict stability has been attained through high troop densities. As Figure 1 shows, a RAND study of recent nation-building campaigns asserts that in order to be successful these efforts required approximately 20 troops per thousand in the population. For Iraq, the level of manning identified by the RAND report equates to approximately 500,000 troops, or more than three times our current level of manning 4 . A key motivating theme that led to the SPEYES effort was addressing the challenge of trying to enhance the SASO effectiveness of a limited number of forces in a highly complex, dynamic, and unpredictable post-conflict environment through various force-multiplying technologies.
To narrow the focus, the SPEYES seedling initiative analyzed, simulated and assessed the force-multiplying payoff potential of various ground-based C3I technologies for daily-occurring manpower-intensive SASO problems within the Green Zone (see Figure 1 ). The analysis and simulation was focused on the cordon and search SASO mission specifically. Key tasks that ground forces needed to perform with respect to cordon and search were identified and simulated. Several existing and emerging technologies were characterized and modeled in the simulation. The results attained were promising and they showed that forcemultiplying payoffs are possible using an array of integrated sensing, situation awareness, C2 and shaping technologies. These results will be discussed, and they include numerous technical and operational performance metrics.
SPEYES System Overview
The process of developing the architecture for a system that addressed the SPEYES challenge was to first characterize the challenges facing troops performing the three SASO missions of fixed site security (check points, guard towers), mounted and dismounted patrols, and cordon and search. This understanding was key to investigating the force multiplier payoff potential of a collection of integrated lowcost ground-based existing and emerging C3I technologies. The following three component technologies proved to be critical in the general SPEYES system architecture:
(i) Sensing technologies -low-cost, easily-emplaced, camouflaged sensors (video, acoustic, IR, EOD) to provide urban situation awareness;
(ii) SA/C2 technologies -multi-echelon software tools tailored for distributed operations (planning, dynamic resource management, simulation, mission rehearsal);
(iii) Shaping technologies -non-lethal, audio hot-spotting and EOD shaping tools for example to diffuse adversaries, crowds, IEDs, VBIEDs, etc.
The three SPEYES technology enablers increase the effectiveness of the forces for SASO by means of better threat detection/prediction, increased situational awareness and intelligence of the post-conflict environment (physical and social), and improved decentralized operations. For example, SPEYES technology and sensors will increase the speed and ability of U.S. forces to gather intelligence by the combined use and smart placement of visual, acoustic, spectral, and IR sensors. The information gathered from the sensor observations allows troops and commanders to gain better situational awareness and facilitates more efficient scheduling and patrolling, including the utilization of innovative shaping technologies. Better and faster observations, combined with more accurate and timely orientation, permitted better and more focused decisions leading to quicker and more effective actions on the part of the U.S. forces.
Figure 2. Green Zone
As Figure 3 illustrates, the SPEYES system architecture is envisioned to be a ground-based, decentralized, multiechelon C3I system comprised of Sensing, SA/C2, and Shaping technologies, and tailored for Battalion through the Squad level small unit forces.
While innovative technologies and new operational concepts can present a force multiplier individually, the goal of the seedling initiative was to explore and determine the impact and force multiplier payoffs that an integrated system of varied technologies might provide. Our objective for the SPEYES system was also to distribute and aggregate information at different echelons of the military force, not simply fuse together information from different sources to provide a common operational map. In terms of force multipliers, Figure 4 illustrates notionally how "security" coverage that a given security force can effectively provide could possibly expand with the introduction of various technologies. Three different types of security are critical in a post-conflict environment and have been determined to be necessary requirements for a SPEYES security system for our forces (force protection), security for the locals (population protection), and security for critical infrastructures (critical infrastructure protection). Some force multiplier technologies that might be exploited to provide the needed security might include tracer RFIDs, swarming UV's, multi-spectral cameras, crowd dynamics modeling, dynamic planning, smart scheduling, non-lethals, along with other possibilities.
SPEYES Experiment: Basic Constructs
To address these goals, we developed a flexible, controllable, distributed simulation/experimental paradigm suitable for examining the security dynamics in a postconflict mission environment and for quantifying the potential performance improvements of a SPEYES system over current practices. This simulation model captures many of the key SASO system dynamics that the SPEYES system will need to address.
The purpose of our simulation model was to show the improvements in both efficiency and effectiveness achieved with the SPEYES system. Operational efficiency focuses on maintaining the same degree of force protection, while decreasing the number of personnel, amount of equipment, and cost and/or resources needed to sustain a particular level of protection. Effectiveness is defined by improved force protection and incident prevention. This includes protecting, reducing harm and damage to US and host nation personnel in terms of numbers Killed-in-action (KIA) and Woundedin-action (WIA), thwarting planned attacks by insurgents, decreasing the amount of damage and number of attacks sustained by US equipment and the host nation's infrastructure.
Military Context for Simulation Scenario
To create our simulated scenario, we utilized a military scenario similar to that used at the National Training Center in Ft. Irwin, California, where Tiefort City, a simulated third world city in the Mojave Desert, is used for urban warfare training. US and coalition forces are conducting multi-phase operations to maintain security and stability in the simulated Tiefort City (TC), which is an area of 5x5 square miles containing 38 buildings with a population of 200 Iraqis. US Forces are composed of 1 Battalion and 4 Companies.
ALPHA and DELTA companies are dedicated to reconnaissance operations; CHARLIE and BRAVO companies are assigned to cordon, search, and secure operations in TC. The latter two companies are decomposed into 6 Platoons, comprised of 26 Squads. Special Operations Forces (SOF) embedded in the city for the last 3 months, report that insurgency in the city is growing.
Recent intelligence suggests that local government is on the verge of collapse and the security of a power plant -the only source of electricity in the area -is threatened. Surrounding area reconnaissance including the hills around TC and the route from Forward Operating Base (FOB) to TC, has been conducted by the ALPHA and DELTA companies. Currently, CHARLIE and BRAVO companies have moved from their position at FOB to the entrance of TC and are ready to commence operations to secure the power plant in Tiefort City and suppress the insurgency. The insurgents are threatening friendly forces with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), RocketPropelled Grenade (RPG) attacks, Vehicle-Borne Explosives (VBIEDs), and Sniper attacks. Several enemy fighter groups have been seen in the city. It is suspected that insurgents have several bases with weapons caches, which must be found and secured to eliminate further attacks. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the city population's trust in local officials is low. Local paramilitary forces have remained neutral, but intelligence indicates their high sensitivity to any violence and/or civilian casualties.
The area of responsibility and geography map of the scenario is shown in Figure 5 . The objectives of CHARLIE and BRAVO companies are to stop the violence, establish control over the city, secure critical infrastructure, and achieve a return to normalcy in which routine civil and economic activities can take place without disruption. To accomplish these goals, friendly forces must conduct building searches to find and secure weapons caches, interrogate suspected insurgents, search and neutralize snipers and foreign fighters, conduct surveillance, clear and secure strategic buildings, avoid IEDs, prevent VBIED attacks, secure the power plant, establish check points, and deal with crowds in the city. 
Scenario Challenges and Vignettes
Upon entering the city, friendly forces encounter enemy resistance which manifests itself in various attacks by the enemy against US and coalition forces. In our simulated environment, we address key challenges of the urban operations. These challenges are defined as scenario vignettes (events) which are discussed below.
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 
Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs).
A shoulder-fired rocket propelled grenade (RPG) is a very potent weapon. Designed specifically for close combat operations, this simple and affordable weapon poses a serious threat to even the heaviest tanks, against convoys, isolated checkpoints, observation posts, and in certain conditions against low, slowflying or hovering helicopters.
For the purposes of our simulation, we consider only RPG attacks against convoys and light-skinned vehicles. Due to weapons specifics, the RPG carriers are very elusive (firing an RPG from 200-400 meters, and leaving the scene immediately), and are hard to detect before the engagement with current capabilities.
Persistent Surveillance.
To provide security in the city, surveillance checkpoints must be established. This means that significant amounts of manpower are needed. In addition to more general surveillance requirements, SASO missions in urban environments may require continuous monitoring of a building or fairly small area. There may be a need to observe or listen to activities in a particular room; to monitor personnel, equipment, or vehicles entering or leaving a building; or to otherwise observe activities at a town square, park, or other fixed site. Some existing ISR platforms using EO, IR, or radar sensors have sufficient resolution to accomplish these missions covertly from medium to high altitudes. However, if the mission requires identifying either a particular person, a small piece of equipment, or a small package entering or leaving a building, then ISR platforms operating at standoff distances may not be sufficient. In addition, a police-like stakeout by a ground squad in a nearby or adjacent area may be necessary. In our scenario, we model several events that require monitoring of the buildings and streets throughout the city.
Mobile Surveillance.
If the mission requires finding the origin or perpetrators of the attacks, following and/or identifying the suspects might be required. Currently, major challenges exist in detecting, identifying, and tracking human targets using ISR platforms operating at standoff distances, especially in urban areas with the presence of obstructions such as buildings, canopies, foliage, camouflage, etc. exist. An alternative groundbased approach is to put friendly ground forces throughout the city, manning observation posts and roadblocks, patrolling, and generally making it difficult for adversary forces to move without detection. In our simulation, we assumed enemy attackers return to their points of origin; hence, detecting, identifying, and tracking using a groundbased approach would allow finding and securing these sites to prevent future attacks.
Securing buildings and weapons caches.
When weapons -conventional, chemical, or biological, -and/or explosives caches are discovered, they should be secured from access by both enemy and non-combatants. Due to the possibility of casualties, detonating conventional explosives in populated urban areas is risky. To keep the weapons out of the hands of terrorists, significant manpower is needed to secure and guard these sites. In our simulations, we designed several militia bases and weapons cache sites, with the goal of neutralizing (finding and securing) them in order to prevent future attacks on friendly forces.
Vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs).
SASO operations often require friendly forces to control city streets. The amount of control may vary by situation: militias, irregulars, and various combatant forces must be denied the freedom to mass, move, and operate, whether on foot, in modified civilian vehicles, or in armored vehicles. One of the more challenging problems is neutralizing VBIEDs. Currently, not only is identification of the explosives difficult even at established checkpoints, but also preventing the movement of the vehicles when in close proximity to the checkpoint or convoy without inflicting civilian casualties is a challenge. In our simulation, we modeled explosives carried on vehicles to detonate on impact or at a predefined location/time.
Infrastructure search.
To establish security in the city, search operations must be conducted. Both ground sensor networks and airborne platforms have the potential to reduce the manpower demands and risks to friendly forces associated with these operations. Although friendly ground forces are likely still to be required, they could be more effective if cued to problem areas by unmanned sensors. In our simulation, we establish search points that require friendly ground forces to conduct search and secure operations throughout the city.
Crowd control.
At various stages of urban operations and SASO, military forces are confronted with crowds consisting of non-combatants, in addition to armed and violent militia. Crowd characteristics and behaviors are important factors when considering the appropriate actions. In our simulation, we have created vignettes of crowds of various sizes and hostility levels that friendly forces would have to deal with.
US and Coalition Forces
The US and coalition command organization and force composition that conduct the SASO operations is shown in Figure 6 . The forces consists of assets from two companies (CHARLIE and BRAVO), as well as battalion-level force assets. Each company is comprised of three platoons controlled by individual commanders. Each platoon is comprised of two operations (OPS) units (a joint configuration of a Tank and a Bradley), an engineering squad (ENGR), four mobile fire teams (MFTs), and two anti-sniper teams (AST). The OPS unit carries two MFT and AST teams on a Bradley vehicle, and dispatches them to conduct operations inside the city.
Company CHARLIE and BRAVO commanders are responsible for coordinating their assigned platoons. At the battalion level, there is an explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) squad, three military police (MP) squads dealing with detainees and conducting interrogations, two helicopters (HELO) conducting fire support, three medical squads (MED), two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), two allied police (POL) squads, and a Q-36 radar.
In this effort, we modeled various existing and emerging technologies that address the challenges outlined in last section; we also assumed the technologies were integrated into a single SPEYES system. The performance profiles for each of the technologies simulated is too detailed to provide in this paper. To assess the performance effects of the various SPEYES technologies in terms of force multiplier payoffs, we simulated and then compared three organizational configurations for the forces: (i) the organization outlined in Figure 6 without SPEYES technologies, (ii) the organization outlined in Figure 6 with SPEYES technologies, and (iii) half the organization outlined in Figure 6 with SPEYES technologies.
Modeling Paradigm
Our simulation utilizes modeling of four major entities: Assets, Tasks, Resources, and Commanders.
Assets are controllable and/or movable units, e.g.:
• Individual weapons, or weapon systems
• Sensors, UAVs, radars
• Human teams of any granularity level (squad, platoon, company, etc.) Assets are used to process (execute) tasks which involve activities such as attack, kill, observe, apply, negotiate, etc. Attributes defining the assets include: velocity, maneuver constraints, resource capability, 
Platoon Force Tasks are activities/events that require certain resources for successful execution with appropriate friendly assets. Tasks are generated from a mission plan or event list, and can represent:
• Individual targets or enemy actions;
• Location of the search to be conducted;
• Rescue operations, defense and attack;
• Monitor; etc.
The following attributes must be specified in order to define a task: location/movement, appearance time, dynamics, resource requirements, precedence constraints, etc.
Resources are quantitative representations of what assets can do during the mission (asset resource capabilities) and what tasks are required for successful processing (task resource requirements). This means that resources identify the following parameters of the distinct individual capabilities and/or requirements:
• Volume/strength (e.g., OPS has strong Fire capability due to its on-board guns; power plant requires two fire teams to be secured);
• Range (UAV can identify vehicles at a range of five miles);
• Context (MP cannot neutralize an embedded sniper); etc.
The manner in which we model the capabilities of the various assets and weapons has proven itself to be extremely flexible in past efforts (Kleinman et al., 1996) , (Levchuk et al., 2002a,b) , (Kleinman et al., 2003) . The paradigm adopted for our model-driven experiments first defines a set/vector of resources
that is relevant to the problem context at hand. Each element i r defines a resource category or warfare area. Then, every asset is assigned a numerical value for each element i r , which defines that asset's resource capabilities vector. In addition, each task that is contained within the scenario is assigned a vector of resource requirements. The paradigm requires the team to prosecute tasks in such a way that a task's resource requirements are met by the summed resource capabilities of the assets allocated to that task. Thus, resource requirements and capability modeling is used to find asset-to-task allocation.
Commanders are human decision-makers who have the ownership/control over their assigned resources /assets, make decisions about what tasks to select for execution and with what assets, and need to communicate to synchronize assets and decide on task selection and asset employment. The command structure which specifies authority and supportedsupporting relationships among the commanders is determined by the battalion commander. • FIRE = ability to shoot at targets With these definitions, the capabilities of the assets for the US and coalition forces are given in Table I .
Resource Categories and Asset Capabilities

Scenario Tasks
In our simulations, we define a task as an activity that requires execution by friendly forces and is either predefined from a mission plan or must be performed to respond to mission events (e.g., enemy activities). From the vignettes described in subsection 3.2, we developed scenario tasks. Tasks are distinguished by resources required for successful execution and the following three attributes:
(i) hostility -identifies the level of hostility of the task towards the friendly force;
(ii) size -identifies the presence signature or size of the enemy force;
(iii) duration -identifies the time it takes the friendly force to process the task; and (iv) armed -identifies the strength of attack against the friendly forces. The task attributes for our simulated scenario are shown in Table II . In the Tiefort City scenario, the activity of enemy (RED) forces included 13 attacks with IEDs, 5 attacks using VBIEDs, 4 coordinated RPGs attacks, 21 snipers (7 inside buildings, 14 on rooftops), 3 detainees requiring military police interrogation, 5 crowd control situations of varying hostility and sizes; 6 weapons caches, 7 medical first aid incidents, and 11 potential casualty evacuations.
To execute the tasks, decision makers (commanders) follow a multi-stage process (Figure 7) . When the task appears in the scenario, it should first be detected with appropriate sensors. Second, the task must be measured to identify the task's attributes. When the task is selected for execution, the assets that will prosecute this task must be allocated. This is done according to task resource requirements, asset resource capabilities, task and asset attributes, current utilization of assets (location, assignment), and "attack" and "be attacked" ranges of the assets. Then, the selected assets are moved by decision makers using appropriate commands/controls into position within the "attack" range for the task. When assets come into position to execute the task, they start the attack phase, which takes the time specified in the "duration" attribute of the task. 
DDD Simulation Platform Overview
The Dynamic Distributed Decision-making (DDD) tool (Kleinman et al., 1996) Figure 9 outlines the core architecture of the DDD simulator, and Figure 10 displays a screenshot of the DDD simulation for a complex Air Operations mission.
Force Multiplier Measures
The potential force multiplier payoff measures for the SPEYES technologies are numerous. For the purposes of this effort, we assessed the technologies and the integrated SPEYES system in terms of timeliness measures (e.g., throughput, latency, response time), efficiency measures (e.g., troops efficiency, assets damaged, casualties), and effectiveness measures (secured area as a function of patrol units and incident rates with and without the SPEYES technologies, task completion rate, failed tasks, detection coverage). The following summarizes a representative set of these measures.
One of the measures of timeliness considered in our simulations was the mission completion time, which indicates the speed with which the whole mission is completed. The overall throughput, which indicates the rate of activities that a friendly organization can perform, is the ratio of the number of tasks processed to the total completion time of these tasks:
Overall Throughput time completion processed tasks of # = In our simulations, we have considered throughput measures for different classes of tasks for both task processing and identification (e.g., sensor detection throughput, which identified the rate of detecting IEDs, RPGs, and snipers). One of the important indicators of how efficiently the friendly forces can prevent and suppress enemy activities was a measure of number of enemy attacks, which included attacks by IEDs, RPGs, snipers, and enemy fighters. The impact of enemy attacks was assessed in terms of an overall casualties measure, which calculated the casualties based on the probability of kill of a specific enemy attack. In the simulations, we assumed the probability of casualty from an IED attack is 50%, and the casualty from a sniper or RPG attack is 20%.
The troop efficiency signifies the average number of troops that are available to execute a single troop task:
Troop Efficiency tasks troop of # troops available of # = where the number of troop tasks (operations) is computed as the tasks that are assigned to human teams and cannot be prevented or executed by other assets. Troop efficiency was also manifested in assessing the load of specific teams. This was done using the metric of number of engagements of individual teams (e.g., number of engagements of MFT teams had a significant impact on speed of operations). The measures defined above can be computed for all tasks or for specific task/event classes.
Simulation Results
Human-driven Simulation Results
To assess the impact of the SPEYES system, we conducted a DDD human-in-the-loop experiment. Human participants played the roles of US forces commanders (see Figure 6 ). Three Tiefort City mission scenarios (without SPEYES system, with SPEYES, and with SPEYES under a 50% troop reduction) have been played by human teams. These runs address the improvements in both efficiency and effectiveness that can be achieved with the SPEYES system. In this section, we present the mean results from those runs, and discuss their implications.
From simulations results (Figure 10 ) for US and coalition forces with and without SPEYES, we can see that SPEYES provides a significant (46%) reduction in mission completion time (time that it takes to execute Tiefort City mission), a 92% reduction in successful enemy sniper and RPG attacks and 90% reduction in casualties, and significant (48%) improvement in task throughput (number of tasks executed by the organization per hour) and troop utilization efficiency (number of troops available to execute troop tasks). Even in the 50%-reduced force with a SPEYES system, the simulation also shows a significant improvement in performance over regular operations with a full force but without SPEYES, thus confirming the force multiplier effect achievable by utilizing the SPEYES system.
The largest contribution to performance improvements stemmed from the ability of the SPEYES system to detect the threats earlier (sensing component), give this information to the soldiers on the ground (SA/C2 component), and be able to neutralize the threats with novel technologies (shaping component). The effect was threefold. First, the soldiers obtained a better situational awareness about the threats that should be avoided while on patrol and conducting regular security operations. Second, the information supplied the troops with the foreknowledge of "hot spots". This meant that troops had better intelligence about where the tasks (problem areas) were, they obtained this knowledge faster, and were able to act on it (execute tasks) more quickly without redundant searches that would be necessary without the SPEYES system. Additional novel technologies integrated into the SPEYES system have augmented the capability of the US/Coalition organization to prosecute various threats, increasing the speed and decreasing the casualties during the operation. And finally, being able to prosecute enemy activities faster had a preventive effect and led to a reduction in the total number of hostilities throughout the mission.
An example of the above cause-effect can be seen, for example, in the capability of the organization with SPEYES case to detect and neutralize IEDs faster. First, the faster detection provides a better situational awareness to the troops. Second, the robotic EOD technologies allow executing EOD neutralization missions faster and without casualties. As a result, human teams can prosecute their intended missions faster or the troop size can be reduced to maintain the same mission performance, thus demonstrating the capabilities of SPEYES as a force multiplier.
Agent-driven Simulation
Agent-based scheduling for the SPEYES system adapted the optimization-based dynamic planning and scheduling agents for the DDD simulator to include features relevant to a SPEYES security system. These included patrol routes, non-uniform spatial-temporal incident processes, and dynamic assignment of SPEYES assets (e.g., multi-spectral cameras, unmanned vehicles, non-lethal weapons, tracer RFIDs, etc). The potential performance improvements of a SPEYES security system in providing mission monitoring, (re)planning and smart scheduling capabilities are assessed in terms of timeliness, efficiency, and effectiveness measures. 
Agent Framework
The architecture of the agent-driven simulator is shown in Figure 11 . The Shared Data Storage (SDS) provides the DDD state variables (estimates of own and adversary states) that serve as the agent's situational awareness. The Agent Data Storage (ADS) holds the agent's normative behaviors that are specific to a given environment (e.g., geographical responsibility for each decision-maker, possible patrol routes), the various mission monitoring, and (re)planning data and measures. An intelligent synthetic decision-maker (DM) is a computational agent that is situated in the environment and is capable of flexible autonomous actions in this environment in order to meet its design objectives. In the SPEYES security system, the agents represent a set of cooperative DMs, who share a common objective of successfully completing a set of assigned tasks under resource and time constraints and work together to achieve this common goal. The current implementation of the agent system centralized assettask assignment, and decentralized task execution, taking into account communication and coordination delays across the team hierarchy (see Figure 12 ).
In the DDD environment, each DM is equipped with a set of assets that determine the DM's resource capability and are assigned a set of tasks (individually or as a subteam) with a specific set of resource requirements. Situational awareness in the DDD environment includes the detection (existence), measurement (characteristics), and identification (classification) of tasks, and the monitoring of the DM's own assets and those of others. The DM's situational awareness is constrained by the capability of DM's assets, i.e., the detection, measurement, and identification ranges and accuracies. For example, the DM may not be aware of the existence of a task, if it is outside the DM's coverage. Such knowledge has to be communicated among DMs within a team (among coordinating partners). The current implementation addresses this issue as a communication delay among DMs, which translates into delays in task execution. The procedures for the centralized task-asset assignment are outlined in Figure 13 . Periodically, a set of currently ready tasks are assigned to a set of assets for processing. Tasks are allocated to groups of assets such that the aggregated resource capabilities meet or exceed the demands of the task. Task processing in the DDD involves the launching of assets from their parent assets, the traveling of assets from their current locations to the task location, and the pursuing and executing of the task. The execution of a task can only begin when all of its predecessors are completed, and all assets from the assigned asset group arrive at the appropriate locations. Tasks must be executed within a limited time window of opportunity. In addition, an asset can only process one task at a time. The objective task-asset assignment is to distribute the available assets among tasks, such that the overall mission completion time is minimized. A detailed mathematical formulation of the centralized scheduling problem can be found in (Levchuk et al., 2002a&b) . Further details of the agent framework can be found in (Meirina et al., 2003) .
Agent-driven Simulation Results
First, we conducted simulations to calibrate agent performance to that achieved in human-in-the-loop simulations. The task selection and asset employment strategies performed by agents and humans are hard to calibrate, since humans use preplanning and partial domain knowledge not available to synthetic agents. Hence, there were some differences between the performance of agent simulations and human-in-theloop runs (Figure 14a ). On the other hand, we found that the trends exhibited by human and agent simulations were comparable (see Figure 14b ) and indicated the consistent benefits accrued by a SPEYES system. Next, we conducted sensitivity analysis to evaluate the impact of specific classes of SPEYES technologies. In particular, we wanted to analyze the impact of sensing technologies; SA/C2 technologies; and shaping technologies. The DDD simulations did not explicitly model SA/C2 functionality (e.g., information fusion, integrated threat maps, entity and behavioral threat models, etc.); the agent-based simulations had optimal resource allocation and scheduling algorithms embedded in them.
Instead, the performance contributions of the SA/C2 technologies were assumed to be embedded within the sensing and shaping technologies.
To show the benefits of SA/C2 functionality, we assumed two-thirds of sensing and shaping performance improvements were attributed to SA/C2 technologies. This resulted in the relative performance improvements of SPEYES component technologies as shown in Figure 14c , with sensing technologies increasing throughput by 11% and decreasing casualties by 29%, SA/C2 technologies increasing throughput by 49% and decreasing casualties by 62%, and shaping technologies increasing throughput by 12% and decreasing casualties by 2%. These results are intuitive and underscore the importance of the system integration component of SPEYES, viz., combined sensing, SA/C2, and shaping technologies.
Analytical Modeling Approaches
Overview
The focus of combined analytical and simulationbased modeling was to investigate the impact of integrating a collection of existing and emerging technologies within a SPEYES security system, viz., the force multiplier needed to establish the desired SASO efficiency payoff given limited numbers of troops. Analytical modeling based on queuing theory, operations research, and crime mapping techniques guided the agent-based simulation-based effort in assessing the impact of security technologies on the stability regions and/or troops.
For example, the Square Root Law (Kolesar and Blum, 1973) states that the response-time r T of 0 N patrol units is proportional to the square root of the effective
where D denotes the traveled distance, c v signifies the patrol speed, ρ represents the busy (utilization) rate of the patrol unit and c is a constant. Thus, the effective area of coverage is proportional to the number of idle patrol units and the square of the response time. The key objectives of the modeling effort were the following: (i) the systematic evaluation of the impact of SPEYES technologies; (ii) maximizing the effective number of patrols, i.e., troops; (iii) minimizing response time to increase the area of coverage (for the same response time).
Preventive Patrol Model
Preventive patrol constitutes touring an area, with the patrol units scanning for threats and attempting to prevent incidents and intercept any threats in progress. Since preventive patrol is a major aspect of stability operations, the optimal allocation of patrol effort is a key problem to be solved. The spatial-temporal model proposed in this paper enables us to identify "hot spots" by estimating the incident rates in different cells of a patrolled area based on historical data and realtime sensor observations. This information can be used to optimize the frequency of patrol from various cells, and estimate the probability that patrolling units will intercept threats within a patrolled area.
Incident Rate Estimation
We assume that an observation area is divided into λ is assumed to be a Gamma random variable. Assume that there are N patrol units, each of which can travel to any of the geographical cells in the region. The Patrol route is random and is affected by the incidence rates. Finally, only a limited area of coverage (miles) is available for patrol units. Thus, the probability of n ( 1 ≥ n ) events happening in cell j in an interval (t, t+∆) is: 
where r is the normalization constant and {b j , c j }are the parameters defining cell j. Using Bayes' theorem, we obtain
Thus, j λ can be updated using the following formula:
where n j is the number of incidents observed by sensors in cell j. This formula can also be written as a recursive estimation of new j λ :
Estimation of Intercept Probability
We define j l equal to the intercept distance in cell j (travel distance in cell j) and j e equal to the number of patrols that traveled through the cell j during patrol sweep. Accordingly, the average effective travel distance L per cell is equal to
It is assumed that the passing of cell j from a particular direction forms a renewal process. Thus, the mean time between patrol entries into the cell is given by:
where c v denotes the patrol speed. The average patrol frequency of cell j (number of patrols entering the cell per unit of time) is defined as:
Since we assume that the patrol is random and the incidents in each cell are independent of those in other cells, it can be shown that, in the steady state, the probability of coverage of cell j by a patrol moving with a speed of c v and length of patrol T in sweeping distance L is given by:
where T denotes the available patrol time. Thus, the joint probability that at least one incident occurs and at least one incident is covered by a patrol in cell j during an interval of duration T is given by: where ) (miles Φ is the total distance of patrol routes. The solution to this problem is as follows:
Step 1 Step 2: Sort
Step 3: Assign patrols from the cell with highest
Step 4: If constraint as stated in eq. (14) Results, shown in Figure 15 , revealed that SPEYES technologies yielded significant improvements: the intercept probability increased by 57%, whereas the daily casualties were reduced by 43%. 
Sensor Evaluation and Smart Scheduling
Real Time SPEYES simulator provided a vehicle to evaluate the impact of SPEYES sensor characteristics (range, accuracy) and barriers, as well as smart scheduling algorithms. The latter were embedded in the DDD agent models. We model the incidents as spatial-temporal random processes, in which insurgents can move randomly. Sensors are parameterized by their coverage, detection probabilities (P d ,) and false alarm probabilities (P f ). Patrol units seek to capture insurgents, while avoiding incidents.
Patrol units follow predefined routes without SPEYES (see Figure 16a ). The units may be at risk of encountering an incident prior to reaching the insurgent targets with a certain probability; with SPEYES sensors (Figure 16b and 16c) . Patrol units have probabilistic knowledge of the insurgents' locations and the potential incidents. Thus, the patrol units can be rerouted intelligently via smart scheduling to reach the insurgents quickly while minimizing casualties. Without barriers (Figure 16b and 16c) , the insurgents are likely to escape from the patrolled area; while with barriers (Figure 16c ), the insurgents are more likely to be confined to the region, thereby enhancing the probability of being caught. Smart scheduling, which relies on information from sensors, directs the patrol units to follow the shortest path, while avoiding the incidents. This has the effect of improving the probability of catching insurgents and reducing troop casualties.
Simulation results, shown in Figure 17 , demonstrated that a sensor range index (sensor range/casualty range) of 4 or more with good sensor detection (P d ≥70%) and frequent sensor data updates, barriers, and smart scheduling can significantly reduce incident response times, decrease insurgent escape rates, and reduce casualties.
Conclusions and Future Work
DARPA's SPEYES seedling effort focused on analyzing, simulating, and assessing various integrated C3I technologies that could provide a forcemultiplying payoff for three daily-occurring manpower-intensive SASO missions, namely, fixed site security (check points, guard towers), mounted and dismounted patrols, and cordon and search. The focus of this paper was to describe the results of a SPEYES security system that focused on the cordon and search mission. We conducted simulation analysis of the impacts of the proposed system on effectiveness, efficiency, and timeliness of SASO operations on US and coalition forces. Our results show that SPEYES provides a significant reduction in mission completion time, substantial reductions in friendly casualties, large reductions in successful enemy sniper and RPG attacks, and significant improvement in task throughput, and troop utilization efficiencies. Even at 50%-reduced force, a SPEYES system also achieved a significant improvement in performance over regular operations with a full force without SPEYES, thus confirming the force multiplier effect that is achieved by utilizing SPEYES. Our results suggest that significant improvements in manning and operational performance can be achieved by integrating individual novel technologies into a SPEYES system that embraces the improvements in data collection and information dissemination for distributed operations with advanced shaping technologies, active modeling, and decentralized resource management.
